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Abstract
This work addresses the question whether it is possible
to design a computer-vision based automatic threat recog-
nition (ATR) system so that it can adapt to changing spec-
ifications of a threat without having to create a new ATR
each time. The changes in threat specifications, which may
be warranted by intelligence reports and world events, are
typically regarding the physical characteristics of what con-
stitutes a threat: its material composition, its shape, its
method of concealment, etc. Here we present our design of
an AATR system (Adaptive ATR) that can adapt to changing
specifications in materials characterization (meaning den-
sity, as measured by its x-ray attenuation coefficient), its
mass, and its thickness. Our design uses a two-stage cas-
caded approach, in which the first stage is characterized by
a high recall rate over the entire range of possibilities for
the threat parameters that are allowed to change. The pur-
pose of the second stage is to then fine-tune the performance
of the overall system for the current threat specifications.
The computational effort for this fine-tuning for achieving a
desired PD/PFA rate is far less than what it would take to
create a new classifier with the same overall performance
for the new set of threat specifications.
1. Introduction
Automatic threat recognition (ATR) systems for applica-
tions such as airport passenger baggage screening are sub-
ject to expensive and time-consuming processes of certifica-
tion before they can be deployed. As is to be expected, such
systems are designed for a particular set of threat specifi-
cations. Unfortunately, the real world being what it is, the
precise specifications of a threat do not remain constant with
time and depend much on the world events and the evolving
capabilities of the bad guys out there.
Since the cost of developing a totally new ATR for a new
set of specifications can be expensive and time consuming,
it is necessary to explore the possibilities related to the de-
sign of adaptive automatic threat recognition (AATR) sys-
tems that can be quickly adapted to changing threat specifi-
cations. 1
In the context of airport baggage screening using 3D
imaging based on X-ray tomography, threats like home-
made explosives (HMEs) [16] and firearms are character-
ized by parameters such as materials and their composition,
their shapes, the methods expected to be used for their con-
cealment, and so on. When the specifications of such threats
change, the modifications are generally with respect to these
parameters. In this paper, we will focus exclusively on mak-
ing an ATR system for HME detection adaptive with respect
to changes in the materials density (as measured by its x-ray
attenuation coefficient), its thickness, and its mass.
The adaptive framework we present in this paper em-
ploys a two-stage classifier cascade in which the first stage
is designed to operate with a sufficiently high recall rate
over the entire range of expected variability in the threat pa-
rameters that could change. The second stage classifier is
then fine-tuned to the parameters of the current threat spec-
ification.
The two-stage classifier cascade is also provided with an
adaptation protocol for each threat parameter with respect
to which classifier adaptivity is desired. This protocol takes
the classifier created for a given specification of the parame-
ters and modifies it to suit another specification. Depending
on the nature of the parameter involved, this protocol may
entail a revisit to the training data. Even when the training
data is revisited for adaptation, the amount of work involved
in the adaptation process is far less than what it would take
to create a brand new classifier for the new set of parameter
1The need and technical requirements for AATR were developed by
Carl Crawford (Csuptwo), Harry Martz (Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory) and Laura Parker (DHS Explosives Division Science and
Technology Directorate) in collaboration with Northeastern University’s
Awareness and Localization of Explosives-Related Threats (ALERT) Cen-
ter, a DHS Center of Excellence. The datasets and scoring tools used in
the paper were provided by ALERT, which was funded by DHS.
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specifications.
Our AATR system was tested on a dataset [1] made avail-
able by the DHS sponsored ALERT center at Northeastern
University specifically for the purpose of evaluating AATR
algorithms for airport baggage screening. A unique feature
of this dataset are its ORS (Object Requirements Specifica-
tion) files. These files express the specifications of a threat
in terms of its mass, density and thickness. We demonstrate
the “adaptive power” of our approach by adapting our clas-
sifier to range of ORS files.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section II
provides a brief review of the existing work related to ATR
systems and the response of prevalent ATR systems to vary-
ing parameter specifications. This is followed by a formal
description of an Adaptive ATR system in Section III as
well as the principle of operation behind our proposed ap-
proach. Section IV then introduces the Cascaded Classifi-
cation Approach to AATR system design encompassing the
two-stage classifier model, the adaptation protocols adopted
for the threat parameters and the training methodology with
the adaptation protocols using the technique of Dynamic
Sample Weighting. The implemented AATR system is then
described in detail in Section V explaining the overall sys-
tem operation. Finally, the implementation results for test-
ing adaptability on different threat parameters are tabulated
and illustrated in Section VI.
2. Related Work
ATR based on CT imaging for airport baggage inspection
is made challenging by the artifacts that result from metallic
objects that can be in arbitrary locations in a bag [8] [18];
by a lack of apriori structural information as compared to
medical applications of CT [11]; and by large variability in
the CT density range among the objects found in bags.
Much work on algorithms for automated baggage in-
spection has been carried out under the auspices of the De-
partment of Homeland Security’s ALERT (Awareness and
Localization of Explosive-Related Threats) initiatives on
ATR segmentation and object classification [1] [2]. This
has led to the development of a number of ATR segmenters
and classifiers that could potentially be incorporated in the
airport checkpoint security pipeline in the future. Amongst
these, the Stratovan Tumbler proposed by Wiley et al. [17]
makes use of a 3D flood-fill region-growing technique for
segmenting out target blobs from the query image. The
method proposed by Grady et al. [6], on the other hand, em-
ploys isoperimetric graph partitioning [5] to perform seg-
mentation for ATR. Song [15] proposed a sequential seg-
mentation and carving method for ATR segmentation em-
ploying splitting and merging techniques for target extrac-
tion. Other proposed techniques use sieve decomposition
algorithms and adaptive region growing for ATR.
More recent ALERT initiatives [2] have focused on a
contextual classification of the object blobs leading to the
inception of more complex ATR systems using multiple
stages of segmentation and classification. Several algo-
rithms and ATR structures have been proposed in this direc-
tion that include graph-based segmenters, MRF-EM based
image segmentation and decision-tree based ATR systems
[2]. Other methods also provide for an extension of ATR
systems to dual-energy CT scans [10] as well for joint metal
artifact reduction and segmentation [7].
For all these cases, the performance of the ATR systems
is evaluated on their ability to achieve desired values of
precision and recall for specific threats and fixed values of
threat parameters — little analysis is made on what the re-
sponse of these systems would be if these threats and threat
parameters were to vary during runtime. This would be es-
pecially difficult for ATR methods described in [17] and [6]
wherein the segmentation routines are pre-tuned for each
threat specification. On the other hand, the ATR classifiers
in [15][2] [7] can be re-trained to adapt to a new threat but
this involves retraining the ATR from a scratch.
This paper thus analyzes the problem of building an
Adaptive ATR system, i.e., the problem of desensitizing an
ATR system to variations in threat specifications. The two-
stage classifier and the adaptation protocols proposed in the
paper present a modular structure to carry out this desensi-
tization with respect to specific threat parameters (density,
mass and thickness) and without resorting to a complete re-
building of the ATR. The detailed implementation of this
model is elaborated in the following sections.
3. System Overview - Adaptive ATR
3.1. Problem Statement
X-ray based threat recognition for airport baggage
screening can be tricky in case of threats such as home-
made explosives (HMEs) [14] which do not conform to a
distinct shape or form and can be easily concealed. Such
threats are detected on the basis of a materials-based charac-
terization that involves the Region-of-Responsibility (ROR)
[9] or density range (in terms of its x-ray attenuation co-
efficient), total object mass and thickness amongst other pa-
rameters. These specifications are, however, subject to fre-
quent updates and modification with newer developments
and alerts and therefore also require the deployed ATR sys-
tems to be adaptive to these updates. Adjusting and re-
certifying the ATR system for newer updates, however, is
time-consuming and may result in an undesirable opera-
tional downtime. This puts forth the notion of the design of
an Adaptive ATR (AATR) system, which is characterized
by the ability to handle modifications to threat specifica-
tions during runtime while taking minimal effort to retrain
or reconstruct the ATR.
3.2. Principle of Operation:
In this paper, we present a two-stage classifier cascade
architecture for the design of an AATR system - the focus
for this ATR system design is exclusively with respect to
the set of threat parameters that include the material density
range, total object mass and object thickness. The two stage
classifier structure makes use of the knowledge that while
the precise specifications of these threat parameters may re-
quire modification during ATR operation, the range within
which the parameters may vary can be pre-determined and
remains fixed. Thus, the first stage of the cascade is de-
signed to operate over this entire range with a high recall
rate while the second stage fine-tunes the overall system
performance by narrowing down the detection to the pre-
cise specification. Any modification to threat specifications
therefore requires adjusting only the second stage of the cas-
cade thus taking minimal effort to retrain the system.
Now, ATR system performance is generally evaluated on
the basis of the following metrics described in [16]:
Probability of Detection, PD =
TP
TP + FN
(1)
Probability of False Alarm, PFA =
FP
FP + TN
(2)
where TP, FP, TN and FN are True Positive, False Pos-
itive, True Negative and False Negative values respectively
for the detected and total number of target objects on the
dataset used for training the ATR. Here, Probability of De-
tection (PD) denotes the probability that the detected ob-
ject is a threat while the Probability of False Alarm (PFA)
denotes the probability that the detected object is a false
alarm. We use these same performance metrics to evaluate
the AATR system response as well - the proposed AATR de-
sign aims at obtaining PD and PFA values that are as close
to the target values as possible.
For each of the three threat parameters, namely, Den-
sity, Mass and Thickness, we employ an adaptation proto-
col specified by the Dynamic Sample Weighting technique
explained in later sections. This technique allows tuning the
system performance for the precise specification values of
the threat parameters and also allows for adjusting system
PD and PFA by moving along the ROC curve.
The dataset used for training and testing our architec-
ture is the TO-4 dataset [1] made available by ALERT cen-
ter at Northeastern University - this dataset contains 188
instances of CT baggage scans with labeled ground truth
images showing saline, rubber and clay objects. We used
threat specifications expressed in terms of target ranges of
density, mass and thickness to test the adaptive power of
our system - system performance was evaluated by creating
an AATR classifier for one specification set, creating new
specification sets by modifying one or more threat parame-
ter values and checking how well the new system adapts to
these new specifications in terms of PD and PFA.
4. Proposed Methodology - Cascaded Classifier
Architecture:
Figure 1 shows the block diagram for the two-stage
cascaded classifier AATR architecture along with an ex-
ample illustration for the case of a varying density range
specification for threat detection. (To characterize X-ray
based detection, we express the density range in Modified
Hounsfield Units or MHUs, i.e., Hounsfield Units offset by
1000 to yield a non-negative range of values). From the
example illustration, we can see how the Stage I classifier
which is designed to detect threats or targets over a large
density range (380 - 2470 MHUs, encompassing all possi-
ble densities of the target objects) generates an output with
a high recall rate. The second classifier in the cascade then
fine-tunes this result by narrowing down on the precise den-
sity range for the particular target specification (for exam-
ple, 1050-1215 MHUs for saline objects). Changes in target
specifications therefore only warrant a change in the second
classifier which avoids training the entire AATR system for
the new modification (e.g., changing to a new density range
of 1170-1290 MHUs for detecting rubber objects). A stage-
wise description of the system is given ahead:
4.1. Stage-wise System Description:
Stage I Classifier:
The basis for operation of the cascaded classifier architec-
ture lies in the notion that while the exact target specifica-
tions for ATR operation are subject to change, the overall
range within which these values vary remains fixed. The
Stage I classifier therefore is designed to identify any object
whose threat specification falls within the acceptable global
range for any of the threat parameters. Because this range
remains fixed, the Stage I classifier does not need to be re-
trained or retuned for every new modification to the threat
parameter values during the AATR operation. For the cur-
rent implementation, the Stage I classifier is a Graph-based
segmenter [6] that segments out and generates a set of can-
didate target blobs from the input query image. Since all
of these blobs do not satisfy the precise threat specification,
the output of the Stage I classifier is riddled with a number
of false alarms giving a high PFA rate - this is taken care of
in the second stage of the cascade.
It is important to remember that the objective of an ATR
system is not to partition the query image into threat and
non-threat regions but to extract uniquely labeled segments
from the image that correspond to different objects within
the baggage. Thus, a challenging task for an ATR system
in general is to be able to distinguish between two touch-
ing objects or one object contained within another - it is
a non-trivial problem as one explosive concealed within a
Figure 1: Block Diagram for the Two-Stage Classifier Cascade Architecture for the AATR System with an Example Illustration. The example shows the
AATR operation for the case of three threat specifications with varying density ranges in Modified Hounsfield Units or MHUs. (1000 − 2000 MHUs,
1050− 1290 MHUs, 1050− 1215 MHUs). The Stage I classifier generates a set of candidate blobs over a wider density range (380− 2470 MHUs) while
the Stage II classifier then narrows down the detection to the specific density range.
collection of similar but benign objects can be overlooked
as a false alarm if not treated as a separate segment during
the ATR operation. This problem is addressed in our imple-
mentation through the use of graph partitioning [13].
Stage II Classifier:
Once the set of candidate target blobs has been generated
by the Stage I classifier, the Stage II classifier in the cascade
fine-tunes the result by classifying these blobs as per the ex-
act threat specifications. For the case in Figure 1, the Stage
II classifier in the cascade filters only those blobs from the
Stage I classifier output that match the density range pro-
vided in the threat specification. Depending on the threat
parameter to be modified, the classifier may need to be re-
trained by revisiting the training data but since this con-
stitutes only a part of the entire AATR cascade, it avoids
retraining the entire system. We employ different adapta-
tion protocols for the threat parameters under consideration,
each of which is explained in the next section.
4.2. Adaptation Protocols:
Diffferent threat parameters warrant different adaptation
protocols to be adopted to adjust to a new modification. For
parameters such as mass, this may be as simple as chang-
ing a threshold to prune lighter masses from the candidate
blobs while for parameters like density, it may require re-
training the entire Stage II classifier using histogram-based
descriptors. The three different adaptation protocols for the
three parameters under consideration, i.e., Mass, Density
and Thickness are described as follows:
Tuning for Target Mass Range:
As mentioned above, the protocol for adapting to a modi-
fication in the target mass range simply involves changing
the threshold for pruning light masses from the set of candi-
date blobs generated by the Stage I classifier. A very good
approximation of the mass of the candidate blob can be ob-
tained by integrating over the voxel-wise CT density values
within the blob volume - this can be used to filter out those
blobs which do not fit into the specified mass range.
Tuning for Target Density Range:
Density range specifications for threat identification are the
main parameters for the materials based characterization
of the threat and are determined from the average density
range of the constituent material of the target [1]. However,
since the material composition of any object is never com-
pletely homogeneous, it is difficult to determine the material
composition by considering an absolute range for the den-
sity specification [17] - this is especially difficult for small
and thin blobs wherein the density distribution is corrupted
by even a small quantity of noise, artifacts or contamination.
To adapt the AATR system to varying densities, there-
fore, we make use of a random forest classifier that is
trained over the ALERT TO-4 dataset to identify target
blobs composed of the desired material of interest. This
classifier makes use of Normalized Density Histograms
as classification features and is trained and tested on the
dataset using ten-fold cross-validation. Specification of a
new density range for the threat, thus, requires re-training
of this classifier for the new desired density window.
Tuning for Target Thickness Range:
Thickness has become an important parameter for threat
recognition since the occurrence of several recorded inci-
dents of transporting HMEs concealed as thin plasticized
sheets. Determining thickness of a sheet object can be diffi-
cult especially as the sheet within the baggage can be placed
in a mangled or folded form. The adaptation protocol for the
target thickness range involves construction of a 3D Thick-
ness Vector for the candidate blob. This thickness vector is
calculated for an object by calculating the median thickness
of the object along each of its oriented principal axes and
normalizing it over the largest thickness value (for the mul-
tiple folds of the sheet, the thickness vector is scaled by a
suitable multiplier). A simple KNN Classifier based on this
vector is then trained to identify objects within the target
thickness range. In our implementation, the Thickness Vec-
tor is used for Dynamic Sample Weighting by concatenating
it to the Density Histogram feature vector.
4.3. Dynamic Sample Weighting:
In our AATR implementation, the three adaptation proto-
cols are implemented simultaneously using a single classi-
fier through use of Dynamic Sample Weighting. This tech-
nique regulates the retraining of a classifier to adapt to the
modification of one threat parameter by utilizing the knowl-
edge of the values of all available parameters. By assigning
a higher weight to those training samples whose parame-
ter values are closer to the desired range and training the
classifier accordingly, a better classification response can
be obtained compared to the independent execution of the
adaptation protocols.
In this method, a random forest classifier is constructed
wherein the feature vector contains the Normalized Den-
sity Histogram and the Thickness Vector concatenated to-
gether. While training, each training sample in the dataset
is assigned a weight that is determined by the vicinity of
the sample parameter values to the target parameter range.
To calculate the weights, we take into account the specified
range for each of the three threat parameters and construct
a Gaussian Weighing Function (See Figure 2). This can be
exemplified for the case of Thickness as follows:
Figure 2: Gaussian Weighting Function for Target Thickness Range
[6.5, 10.0] mm with a standard deviation, σ = 1.0 and binarizing thresh-
old, t = 0.8. The parameters σ, t are optimized to obtain the desired
PD-PFA performance while retraining.
Let us consider the thickness range specified by the min-
imum and maximum values of 6.5 mm and 10.0 mm respec-
tively. Comparing the thickness of the current training sam-
ple with these limiting values, a sample weight is assigned
to this sample using the Gaussian Weighting function illus-
trated in Figure 2. The expression for this Gaussian Weight-
ing Window for minimum and maximum limiting values, Tl
and Th is given by:
w(t) = e
[(
t−Tl−0.1Td
σ
)2]
t ≤ T ′l (3)
= 1.0 T ′l < t ≤ T ′h
= e
[(
t−Th+0.1Td
σ
)2]
T ′h ≤ t
where σ is the standard deviation, t is the thickness of the
current sample and Td = |Th − Tl| is the thickness range,
T ′h = Th − 0.1Td and T ′l = Tl + 0.1Td.
The total sample weight is thus the product of the in-
dividual sample weights for the threat parameters, Mass,
Thickness and Density. The classifier is retrained with these
sample weights for any modification in the specified threat
parameters. Dynamic Sample Weighting also allows tuning
the classifier performance for a target PD and PFA - this
is done by adjusting the standard deviation σ of the Gaus-
sian weighting function and the threshold t on the sample
weights that generates the positive/negative samples for the
specific OOI. A grid-based search is used to find the opti-
mum values of σ, t that give the PD and PFA values closest
to the target values during cross-validation.
4.4. Tuning for Desired PD and PFA Response:
Figure 3: Adjusting PD/PFA for the AATR system: The two-stage cascade
allows for a mechanism to adjust the target PD/PFA, PD(T ), PFA(T )
for the entire system by adjusting only the PD/PFA for C2, i.e.,
PD(2), PFA(2). In the figure, N(i) denotes the set of filtered voxels
at the ith stage; PD(i), PFA(i) denote the PD/PFA for the ith classifier.
To adapt to the desired PD/PFA requirements, the cas-
caded classification structure requires a mechanism which
allows tuning the AATR classifier performance along the
ROC curve without retraining the entire AATR system. For
the cascaded architecture, this can be done by tuning the
respective Stage II classifier as elaborated below:
Consider the Stage I classifier C1 and the Stage II clas-
sifier C2 connected in a cascade as shown in Figure 3
with the respective PD, PFA values PD(1), PFA(1) and
PD(2), PFA(2) while the target PD, PFA for the total sys-
tem are given by PD(T ), PFA(T ). As the output of C1 is
directly fed to C2 as input, it is evident that the total PD of
the cascaded system is equivalent to the product of the PD’s
of the individual blocks and this holds true for PFA as well:
PD(T ) = PD(1) · PD(2) (4)
PFA(T ) = PFA(1) · PFA(2) (5)
Now, because the Stage I classifier is only trained
once, the values for PD(1), PFA(1) remain fixed but
PD(2), PFA(2) can be adjusted for every new modifica-
tion to the threat specifications as the Stage II classifier is
retrained. The target PD, PFA can thus be obtained by tun-
ing C2 to attain the following PD, PFA values:
PD(2) =
PD(T )
PD(1)
; PFA(2) =
PFA(T )
PFA(1)
(6)
By using Dynamic Sample Weighting in our implemen-
tation, we attempt to attain the desired PD, PFA values
by adjusting the thresholds of the sample weights and the
spread of the Gaussian weighting function.
5. System Implementation
We have implemented the proposed two-stage cascaded
classification structure using a Graph-based ATR segmenter
and a Random Forest classifier as the Stage I and Stage II
classifiers in the cascade. The AATR system was tested for
its adaptability by subjecting it to different sets of threat
specifications grouped into three categories: Varying Den-
sity (or constituent materials), Varying Mass and Varying
Thickness - the ALERT TO-4 dataset [1] was used for the
testing that included different target objects selected out of
three Materials-of-Interest (MOIs), namely, saline, rubber
and clay. The dataset contains 188 training samples con-
sisting of CT scans of baggage that contained both target
and non-target objects, in bulk as well as sheet form. The
details for each stage of the structure are given ahead:
5.1. Stage I Classifier:
The Stage I Classifier is constructed based on the ATR
described in [17] with its blocks explained below:
Pre-Processing:
The CT query image is first pre-processed using Mumford-
Shah energy minimization [12] via the Ambrosio-Tortorelli
approximation [4] to reduce the noise and artifacts and gen-
erate smooth sections for further segmentation. The 3D en-
ergy minimization is carried out with a parameter set for the
minimizer (α, β, ) [4] adjusted to (1000, 0.9, 0.1).
Supervoxel Segmentation:
The pre-processed image is then subjected to Supervoxel
segmentation using SLIC [3] with an initial number of seg-
ments n segments = 1000 and compactness, c = 40. The
supervoxels are then filtered depending on whether their
mean density lies within the pre-determined global range
for threat densities (380− 2470 MHUs).
Graph-Partitioning:
To address the problem of segmenting out individual objects
uniquely, a Normalized Cuts algorithm [13] is used to par-
Figure 4: Block Diagram for the Graph-Based Segmenter implemented as the Stage I Classifier. The segmenter works in three stages: (i) Pre-processing -
Mumford-Shah Energy Functional is used to reduce noise/artifacts, (ii) Supervoxel Segmentation - Image is oversegmented to generate candidate supervoxels,
(iii) Graph Partitioning - Filtered supervoxels are partitioned on a density-based RAG (Region Adjacency Graph) to generate the candidate blobs.
tition the set of filtered supervoxels into a set of candidate
blobs on the basis of intensity difference and the presence
of a distinct boundary between two supervoxels. To do so,
a graph is constructed for the set of supervoxels with edge
weights calculated as follows:
w(i, j) = ηe · ηn · exp
[
(Ii − Ij)2
σ
]
exp
[
S(i, j)2
0.25
]
(7)
where:
• S(i, j) = No. of boundary voxels with a distinct edgeTotal No of boundary voxels between Nodes i, j
• ηn - Set to 1 if Node i and Node j are neighbors
• ηe - Set to 1 if S(i, j) > 0.25.
• Ii, Ij - Mean intensities of Nodes i and j.
• σ - Global density range for all threats.
The Normalized Cuts algorithm is then applied with a
threshold, t = 0.1 to generate the set of candidate blobs.
5.2. Stage II Classifier - Random Forest:
For the threat parameters specified for a known con-
stituent material, i.e., with samples present in the TO-4
dataset (namely, saline, rubber or clay), the Stage II clas-
sifier used is a Random Forest classifier with 50 estimators
and using the Gini impurity criterion. The Stage II classi-
fier uses a feature vector consisting of a 100-bin Normal-
ized Density histogram and a 3D Thickness vector concate-
nated together. The density histogram features are weighted
with a value of 0.5100 = 0.005 while the thickness vector is
weighted with 0.53 = 0.167 to normalize the feature vector -
if the target thickness does not change in the new modifica-
tion, the respective weights are set to zero. The output blobs
of the Stage II classifier are then filtered using the mass fea-
ture pruning lighter masses from the final output image.
6. Results
The implemented AATR system was tested for its adapt-
ability on the ALERT TO-4 dataset [1]. This dataset con-
sists of 188 CT scans of bags that contain target objects
made from saline, rubber and clay and non-target objects
that can typically be found in passenger baggage at airports.
The target objects are both in bulk and in sheet forms.
As previously mentioned in the Introduction, target spec-
ifications for testing for adaptability are in the form of ORS
(Object Requirements Specification) files. Through a spec-
ification of the minimum and maximum value for the three
parameters — mass, density, and range — an ORS file de-
clares what it means for an object to be a target. Each ORS
file also specifies the desired PD and PFA for the classifier
performance for that target.
We tested our AATR system for adaptability by subject-
ing it to nine ORS files, each with a different threat spec-
ification for one of the three material specific parameters
— mass, thickness, or density. In three of the ORS files,
only the mass specification changed, in another grouping of
three, only the density changed, and in yet another grouping
of three, only the thickness changed. With regard to the de-
sired AATR performance, it was the same for all ORS files:
90% for PD and 10% for PFA.
(a) AATR 1*: Graph-based ATR Segmenter for Stage I
(b) AATR 2: Supervoxel-based ATR for Stage I
(c) AATR 3: CCL-based Segmenter for Stage I
Figure 5: PD/PFA Performance of AATRs with different systems for Stage
I classification: The figure shows the response of three different AATRs
for the cases of Varying Density, Varying Mass and Varying Thickness.
Each AATR is implemented with a different system as its Stage I clas-
sifier - these systems include a Graph-based ATR Segmenter (AATR 1),
a Supervoxel-based ATR classifier (AATR 2) and a CCL-based ATR seg-
menter (AATR 3) respectively. The performance range of current ATRs for
PD and PFA has been obtained from [2] is denoted by a green band in the
figure. *AATR 1 gives the best adaptive response and has been explained
in detail in this paper.
Table 1: Adaptation to Varying Threat Parameters (AATR 1) - Varying
Density Range (Target Materials)
Material Stage I Classifier AATR
(Density Range) (PD %, PFA %) (PD %, PFA %)
saline∗ (91 %, 53 %) (90 %, 12 %)
rubber∗ (87 %, 62 %) (85 %, 13 %)
clay∗ (83 %, 66 %) (84 %, 13 %)
Table 2: Adaptation to Varying Threat Parameters (AATR 1) - Varying
Mass
Mass Stage I Classifier AATR
Range (PD %, PFA %) (PD %, PFA %)
> 400 g (86 %, 69 %) (83 %, 12 %)
> 300 g (88 %, 66 %) (86 %, 17 %)
> 100 g (86 %, 64 %) (82 %, 15 %)
Table 3: Adaptation to Varying Threat Parameters (AATR 1) - Varying
Thickness
Thickness Stage I Classifier AATR
Range (PD %, PFA %) (PD %, PFA %)
> 10.0 mm (89 %, 65 %) (85 %, 7 %)
6.5− 10.0 mm (86 %, 63 %) (83 %, 9 %)
0− 6.5 mm (86 %, 62 %) (83 %, 9 %)
Note: The saline, clay and rubber objects correspond to the density ranges
(1050-1215), (1170-1290) and (1530-1715) MHUs respectively. The dif-
ference between PFA(T ) and PFA(1) for all cases shows the effect of
fine-tuning the Stage I classifier output in the second stage of the cascade.
The PD/PFA performance as achieved by our AATR sys-
tems for the three ORS groupings is illustrated in Figure 5.
The figure shows the PD/PFA values achieved for both the
Stage I classifier (red) and the total AATR system (blue)
after the Stage II classifier is added - this is shown for the
case of three AATRs implemented with a different Stage I
classifier: AATR 1 is implemented from a Connected Com-
ponent Labeling (CCL)-based ATR segmenter [2], AATR
2 is derived from a Supervoxel-based ATR classifier while
AATR 3 is based on the Graph-based ATR segmenter [6]
that we have implemented and explained in detail in the
previous sections. We see a marked drop in the PFA val-
ues as a result of the fine-tuning performed by the Stage
II classifier for all three cases. For comparison, the green
band in the figure is for the mainstream ATRs described in
[2]. This figure establishes that the overall performance of
an AATR framework need be no worse than what it is for
well-designed ATR algorithms out there. This is also ex-
emplified by a comparison between the ROC curves of the
Figure 6: ROC Response Curve for the Implemented AATR: (i) the imple-
mented AATR system, (ii) a Supervoxel-based ATR classifier for reference
[2], (iii) the desired ROC curve for system operation. The systems were
trained to detect saline objects with a fixed set of specifications to achieve
the desired ROC curve. The ATR in this case was completely retrained for
a new variation while the AATR adapts to the variations.
AATR system with that of an ATR system trained on a fixed
set of material-specific parameters, as shown in Figure 6 -
our use of Dynamic Sample Weighting produces a response
within an acceptable range from the ATR ROC curve.
The PD/PFA response for AATR 1 is also tabulated in
Tables 1, 2 and 3 for a numerical demonstration. We see that
the standard deviations for the PD and PFA do not exceed
above 2.62% and 2.05% respectively in all cases showing
stable behavior against varying threat specifications.
7. Conclusion
The results obtained with our AATR architecture for
designing adaptive classifiers for threat recognition show
that the overall classification performance with an adaptive
framework need be no worse than what can be achieved
with a traditional approach that calls for creating a brand
new classifier for each new definition of what constitutes
a threat. Considering that the work required for the fine-
tuning of the Stage II classifier in our AATR is much less
than what it would take to create an ATR from ground zero,
our work establishes the viability of AATR frameworks for
automatic target recognition.
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